Both as a lawyer of international reputation and as a high-ranking officer in the Swiss Army, Robert Briner has always taken an active interest in national and international security-through its ups and downs-and in academic teaching and research. It is thanks to this sadly all too rare combination of curiosity and commitment that Robert Briner chaired with a much appreciated combination of professional competence and amicable support the Board of the Programme for Strategic and International Security Studies (PSIS), which the present author had created as professor at the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva.

During these many years of collaboration and friendship, which coincided with the thaw and then the end of the Cold War, international security and its underlying concepts and challenges have undergone dramatic changes. The scourge of murderous international wars has gradually moved into the background. Although it has not completely disappeared, some observers maintain that this kind of war has, for all intents and purposes, had its day. They point out that in 2003, depending on the criteria used, no more than two or three such traditional wars took place, including the one against and then in Iraq.

There are several reasons for what may be welcomed as a clearly positive development. In very general terms, it would seem that the combination of the ever more frightening destructive power of modern weaponry, on the one hand, and the growing vulnerability of highly industrialized societies, on the other, substantially reduces the incentives for going to war. It at least raises the costs of war to such an extent that any such bellicose adventure becomes in the end senseless and counterproductive, as amply evidenced by the ongoing tragedy in Iraq.

It is precisely the recognition of the disproportionate costs of modern war that serves as an incentive to seek and, if possible, institutionalize cooperation, or even integration, at regional and international level. This desire provided the [Page327:]

motor for European integration: present-day Europe and its institutional backbone, the European Union, is a pioneer in this respect. Other regions are moving in a similar direction, each in its own way and according to its specific traditions and interests. Serious efforts are being made within the newly constituted African Union to cope with the manifold and often murderous wars in Africa, as witnessed in Sudan and the Côte d'Ivoire; while in Asia, forms of cooperation and consultation are being developed cautiously and pragmatically in various countries from China and Japan to the Association of South East Asian States (ASEAN), particularly with a view to combating acts of terrorism and banditry on the high seas.

New area of insecurity

Encouraging as these developments may be, are they enough? The international community is realizing, albeit slowly and reluctantly, that the world has entered what appears to be an entirely new era of insecurity or, rather, an era with new kinds of threats to its security. The time-honoured concepts, policies, organizations and strategies which saw security in terms of assembling and training traditional armies and organizing collective defence would seem to have outlived themselves. Although it might be premature and even dangerous to rule out the possible recurrence of traditional wars, it would seem important to prepare more systematically for other less conventional kinds of armed violence, with the help of an updated, better equipped and, hopefully, global institution.

Today, the world finds itself in a new ball game, confronted with a growing multitude of players, willing and fully able to equip themselves with arms and to use them to achieve their particular objectives, claims and aspirations, or simply to express their grievances and resentments. They tend to choose targets that are particularly vulnerable or, like New York's World Trade Centre, have a particularly symbolic significance.

Such groups can be rebellious tribes, oppressed minorities, religious fanatics or ideological terrorists. Most, if not all of them, have practically unhindered access to weapons of every imaginable kind-from side-arms to assault rifles and submachine guns to anti-tank weapons, to name but a few-available on the international markets and euphemistically called 'small arms'. The Soviet-Russian-made assault rifle Kalashnikov, for instance, is currently manufactured in several countries, and an estimated 70 to 100 million of them are to be found in some eighty countries. [Page328:]

Thus, the number of non-State actors and of the weapons available to them has multiplied many times over. What used to be a world almost exclusively controlled by States and their respective governments has-almost imper-ceptibly-undergone a profound and revolutionary change. As yet we have neither a name for it nor the necessary concepts and instruments to cope with it. The difficult and no doubt long process of adjusting to this new and complex situation will require both time and imagination from the international community.

Together, the increasing vulnerability of modern societies and the growing diversity of potentially violent, well-armed and mobile non-State actors have added a new and rather troubling dimension to international security, or rather insecurity. The former century-old monopoly of power, jealously held and exercised by States and their governments, is gradually being eroded, if not indeed directly challenged or undermined. As the authority of States as guarantors of security weakens-or simply becomes less reliable-so does that of the international organizations they have together set up, not least the United Nations.

To a certain extent, today's world is paying a heavy price for the much acclaimed- but also much criticized-economic and technological globalization. It was shortsighted or an illusion to think that worldwide economic and technological activity could go on regardless without being underpinned by a concomitant global security network. Reliance on the United Nations, created over half a century ago under totally different circumstances and never updated in its structure and decision-making procedures, is no longer viable. The international community is now paying the price of not having adapted and adjusted the United Nations to this new international environment, all the more demanding for being so complex.

This failure can be attributed to two mistakes or shortcomings: on the one hand, the unwillingness of the now over one hundred and ninety member States to engage seriously in an admittedly difficult and sensitive process of institutional reform, and, on the other hand, the reluctance to recognize that the multitude and diversity of new security challenges call for equally new and more appropriate forms of international cooperation. [Page329:]

Multitude of players

Adaptation and institutional reform are more easily said than done. One obvious reason is that almost two hundred member States are involved, differing enormously in status and outlook. This is particularly relevant when defining political equality, economic and social equity, the extent and direction of internal institutional and societal reform and, last but not least, the ways and means of preserving international security. A second reason is, as mentioned before, that States have lost their monopoly of power. No longer are there only States and governments, however well established or efficient, in the arena, but also innumerable other players with the will and the power to pursue their specific aims with ever more devastating 'instruments of power'. These can take the form of arms, communication technologies, huge amounts of money, religious pamphlets and missionaries.

It is possible to identify at least four categories of non-State players. All of them move on the international stage and try, in one way or another, to influence events and those responsible for them. They all pursue their very specific and often narrow objectives with sometimes-to put it mildly-rather unorthodox means. Most of them are well organized and duly recognized, even if not fully accepted. A good many of them are financially supported by national governments or, more generally, by the 'official' international community. One such player with a very special status is the highly respected International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the federation of its associated national committees. Beyond it, we find a growing number of vastly diverse non-governmental organisations (NGOs), which, in their various ways, pursue a wide spectrum of objectives, some of them more laudable and appreciated by the international community than others. NGOs like Médecins sans frontières and Human Rights Watch take upon themselves tasks that governments either shy away from or are simply unable to carry out. Although this first category of non-State players thus often fulfils a useful and even welcome role, the immense and still growing number of NGOs introduce a hitherto little known, barely controllable and largely incalculable element into international politics and security.

Secondly, there are a growing number of non-State groups pursuing specific objectives often by violent means. They may be demanding recognition as a separate ethnic or religious entity within a given State, claiming more political rights, or simply seeking independence. Sometimes their demands may escalate into overt rebellion against a central government or a State. Such groups number dozens, if not hundreds, worldwide and include terrorists. One of the great [Page330:]

difficulties-indeed, perhaps the insurmountable difficulty-with these groups is to discern which have legitimate claims and which are patently illegitimate or simply and unacceptably dangerous. The many variations of terrorist groups and organizations belong to this category.

The third group includes the widening range of private and semi-private, globally active firms, until recently known as multinationals. They pursue their particular interests through the acquisition of local firms, often very substantial investments, and outsourcing to less costly developing countries. They and their employees are increasingly exposed to hostile acts, and even outright violence, in foreign lands, where they far from their headquarters and particularly vulnerable. The growing concern of these companies for their personnel and property is turning them increasingly into consumers rather than providers of security.

The opposite is true of the fourth category, which comprises the growing number of internationally active private security firms. Predominantly US-based, they offer an ever widening range of security-related services such as the protection of foreign missions, training foreign armies or actually undertaking combat missions. We shall return to this category below, for the simple reason that these relative newcomers to the global scene are becoming ever more part of what, for lack of a better word, might be called 'security providers'. It is they, more than any of the other current developments, that reflect the profound changes international security is presently undergoing.

Diversification of security threats

As threats to security diversify, so do the means of coping with them. Nowhere is this more-and often painfully-evident than in the evolution of the mission the regular armed forces are trained for and expected to carry out. This change is most obvious in the countries of the so-called industrialized world, beginning with Europe. As the danger of traditional war between States thankfully recedes, the need for huge, heavily equipped armed forces is becoming obsolete, obliging governments to rethink not just the role of armed forces in the future but, at the same time, to evaluate the new and in many ways much more complex threats to their and their society's security. A new kind of training is required, as recent experience in the Balkans and then the Middle East has amply shown, together with a change of equipment, now needed for missions over long distances, in mostly unknown territory and against an enemy of a different kind and less easy to identify. [Page331:]

In practically all instances, such new and often highly demanding missions are international in reach and political in content. Combating terrorist groups and possibly even dictatorial regimes in distant countries, establishing order and maintaining peace in war-torn countries, separating violently antagonistic parties, groups and clans from each other, training newly recruited indigenous soldiers to serve in newly formed armies are some of the daunting and costly tasks that call for endurance and an intelligent understanding of local traditions and sensitivities. These and many other missions are already increasingly part of the security agenda and are likely to be even more so in the future. This leads us to conclude that national security no longer ends at State borders but may well-and indeed already does-begin in some faraway place.

This almost limitless extension-both geographic and substantive-of security concerns has its price. As mentioned previously, it goes well beyond the missions traditional armies were trained for and assigned to. Inasmuch as security or, rather, threats to security have become multilayered, many more instruments will be required to provide security. Already, for instance, the judiciary (both national and international), the police, environmental agencies, the banking world and a multitude of other institutions formerly assigned or limited to local or national tasks find themselves called upon to deal with an increasing multitude of security threats, many of which originate in distant places, in cooperation with partners abroad.

The multiplication of direct and indirect 'security providers' and 'security assistants' has become dramatically apparent in the context of the 'war on international terrorism' led by the United States of America. Although not a totally new phenomenon, private security firms have become increasingly numerous and more widely spread as the wars in Afghanistan and, even more so, Iraq presented a security challenge far exceeding what regular armies would appear able to cope with. In both countries, and particularly Iraq, a multitude of chiefly US private security firms have been established, substituting for, or complementing, what the regular forces are either unable or unwilling to do. Their wide-ranging activities include protecting national and international diplomatic missions, guarding prisons, supplying hardware, undertaking major and urgent repair work and even engaging in actual combat.

These generally highly profitable companies carrying out a growing spectrum of activities formerly reserved for governments constitute what is now called 'privatisation of security'.Their emergence, which reflects the ever more [Page332:]

complex and multifaceted nature of security threats, raises questions as to the legality of their activities. This is particularly the case when it comes to judging if and to what extent their activities are in conformity with international law such as the Geneva humanitarian conventions.

One-possibly the most pertinent-explanation of this development lies in the State's abdication of its long-held and defended monopoly of power, including its right to resort to violent means in order to protect its own institutions and people. This reversal of what came to be known as the 'process of civilization' reflects the fact that our traditional notion of security has been overtaken by a new situation in which there are a multitude of players of all kinds performing a wide variety of tasks, and that security must nowadays be maintained and defended on many more fronts than was the case only one or two decades ago. No longer are there any sanctuaries where security can be guaranteed or where it is possible to take refuge behind the long respected walls of neutrality.

Towards a world security organization

Better collaboration between all parties concerned with the growing multitude of security threats is needed. It is no longer right to go it alone-not even for a superpower-for Alleingang is almost bound to be counterproductive, leading to division and resentment likely to obstruct collective and sustained action, which is the only effective means of dealing with the new security threats. It should not have needed the immense tragedy of the Iraq war to prove this.

The biggest challenge to the international community and the ever increasing number of security providers-be they international and regional organizations, national governments, armed forces and the police, qualified and tested NGOs or private security firms-will therefore be to develop common criteria for dealing better and more efficiently with the widening spectrum of security threats. Such joint efforts, if undertaken, might eventually coalesce into a world security organization (WSO). This could gradually become the twin brother of the World Trade Organization (WTO), which is one of the very few global institutions whose decisions are almost always followed, including-most importantly-by the United States of America. If trade, technology, investments and outsourcing can expand on a global basis practically unhindered, it can only make sense to work for comparable globalization with respect to security within and through a parallel institutional framework. [Page333:]

Given the many challenges to national and international security, no one can deny that mechanisms to address and deal with them ought to be improved. This means going well beyond the United Nations. Whatever the merits of the United Nations, set up over fifty years ago in very different circumstances, it increasingly shows a lack of efficiency. Sadly, any substantial reform of its Charter, especially with respect to the Security Council, has little chance of real success and is unlikely to go beyond cosmetic changes. Hence, the time has come to take a fresh look, not just at the manifold threats to world security, but also at more appropriate and efficient ways of coping with and responding to them. The world and its security would greatly benefit therefrom. [Page334:]